CSeries' AdvantageYou can be forgiven if you got the impression CSeries is simply more fuel efficient than other aircraft. It's also much cleaner, quieter, and easier to maintain.
But, what's the real advantage in terms of operating costs for CSeries compared to other aircraft?
The answer is a complicated one. For one thing it's important to keep in mind that we're talking about estimates and not anything which can be accurately measured through direct testing.
Manufacturers in general can't be faulted for underestimating the fuel-savings advantages of their new products. This statement is probably as true of aircraft manufacturers as it is of automobile manufacturers.
Bombardier is quoted, for example, by some sources as saying,
"CSeries will delilver a 16-to-17-percent cash operating cost advantage over the Embraer E195, Airbus A318, and Boeing 737-600".
At the same time Bombardier "...advertises a 20-percent fuel burn advantage for CSeries over all those models". (as outlined in the last paragraph of the article linked here:)
https://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/bombardier-lands-major-c-series-order-24346/
In still other articles Bombardier is quoted as suggesting CSeries sports an even greater cash operating advantage over older aircraft of up to 28%.
Naturally, Embraer takes issues with Bombardier's claims for CSeries, suggesting :
https://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/business/story.html?id=5fa206a5-20f4-496c-8703-147b6a88e430
Meanwhile Boeing and Airbus are telling everyone that they can get operational costs savings in the magnitude of 15% by simply putting Geared Turbofans on their 737s and 320s.
If it was that easy Bombardier could have developed CSeries much sooner. If it was simply a matter of hanging P&W GTFs off an aircraft built of more conventional materials Bombardier would have been to market much earlier.
But it isn't simply a matter of obtaining all your advantage from new jet engines is it? In reality only an estimated 7-to-8% of CSeries' operational costs savings is expected to come from the newere, more fuel-efficient engings. The rest is expected to come from design changes in aerodynamics and in particular, a much greater percentage of newer, lightweight carbon composite materials.
As a result, they can choose to try to market a less efficient aircraft, or they can choose to get to market years later with "me-too" product.
To build similar new designs will take Boeing and Airbus a few years longer than the estimate of 2015 - which is the preliminary expected date they think they could have re-engined 737s up and running.
They're worried because they know neither strategy will allow them to maintain their dominance of this market segment.
Airbus and Boeing face a big challenge in keeping CSeries from taking significant market share. With customers like Southwest and other low-cost airlines taking a serious look at Bombardier's new airplane they're right to be concerned.
It should be clear that Bombardier faces significant challenges getting CSeries out the door as planned. As the 380 and the 787 projects can attest, any new aircraft program involving this degree of technological improvement presents serious obstacles.
If Bombardier stumbles and CSeries is delayed more than a year that would give the giants opportunity to catch up - assuming they can excute development more smoothly. But the experience of the giants with the 787 and 380 do little support that assumption.
While one might expect experience with these programs would help the larger manufacturers to protect their bottom ends, the large number of delays on both the 787 and 380 have to leave you wondering.
Right now the street appears to be assuming Bombardier will stumble to a similar extent as Boeing and Airbus did on their new projects because they aren't giving much value to Bombardier's aerospace business.
If Bombardier does stumble with CSeries in the same fashion and to the same extent, CSeries will probably not become a big money-maker.
Even so, CSeries will remain a valuable learning experience that opens a door for Bombardier to the production of even larger commercial jet aircraft.
And that may be where it's true value lies.