RE:RE:RE:TAX pool of 668 millions...I don't know because I've not been interested enough in the issue to look. Assuming the scattered nature of Gear's assets and its heavy oil weighting, I am in some doubt as to its attraction as an accretive acquisition.
The growth profile (and MD&A mention of acquisitions with FCF) presented by Gear suggests modest growth in production by workovers, waterflood, drilling and tuck-in acquisitions but Gear must also exit its ARO obligations. Either workovers on old wells to wring a barrel or ten or spend the cash to abandon them.
The refusal of the regulator to transfer 450 wells to a specialist workovers company suggests this easy way to get ARO off the balance sheet may no longer be permitted. Investors need to read between the lines to extrapolate what is NOT said rather than concentrating on what is said.
Gear is what it is - a producer able to sustain production for 20 years on maintenance capital and return capital to shareholders for 20 years - a cash cow. But, only as long as management executes on this strategy. Keeping 70% of free cash flow in reserve with vague promises of 'special dividends' gives management way too much wiggle room to spend on growth rather than pay shareholders.
Growth, in this inflationary environment will be too expensive to support on $50 oil. Investors may well find themselves supporting $80 oil on a $70 price.
Notice that the company only comments when material events force them to meet disclosure. Watch what the 'other hand' is doing when presented with 'shiny objects'.