In my view today's drop is that it was a successful 'stop-loss' hunting expedition.
Very low volumes while waiting for news the last few days and then no news today, with only a few 100K of shares transacted in mid morning and then some small volume sells until boom, stop-losses hit.
Not a good idea to set stop-losses on a thin stock like this. Anyway, someone lost and someone will gain.
Cheers,
Notgnu
========= Summary info for anyone new: ========== Reasons to own NCU:
Nevada, USA = one constitution for over 200 years vs DRC = 6 in 60 years
Future open pits have gold and silver credits not pre sold in any stream deal
Future open pits are already permitted to allow 70,000 tpd production
A possible 100,000 tpd mine was recently spoken about by the CEO
Copper has run way beyond the $3.20 price assumptions in the NI-43-101
The new mill is successfully ramping up to 5000 tpd capacity (prob ~50% now)
Full copper production 3rd or 4th quarter 2021
Minimal hedges roll off soon
Covid uncertainty all but gone now with vaccines out
No insider selling for 10 yrs despite past issues
Banks lending at reasonable rates
Highly experienced CEO with 3,500,000 share rights which align him with us.
A mining friendly jurisdiction with plenty of experienced labour availability
A share consolidation of 10:1 to be announced June 30 2021 = more fund buying
Expansion drilling underway, so decades more resources will be added
Potential risks include:
Problems with the mine plan leading to more cost
Copper price dropping a lot
Mine accidents
Another Covid shut down
===============================================
Insider average share cost:
Pala / Iorich ~40 % owner > $0.51 (calculated as of January financing)
NCU director Nutter > $0.32 (calculated as of Dec 2020)
NCU director Albanese > $ 0.41
NCU director Brown > $0.31
NCU chairman Gill > $0.21
NCU senior VP Joseph > $.32
NCU director Cochrane > $0.67
========================================================
An additional 83 million tons or more of ore may be available underground.
More drilling will be done to confirm the size and grade of this ore body and it may easily increase and is very economical at $4.00 copper price.
The current "measured and indicated" category is 54 million tons at 1.39% copper and the "Inferred" is 29 million tons at 1.09% copper. (these are in addition to the 13 years [24 million tons] of 1.6% that we are about to start mining.)
Taken together there is another approximately 60 million tons of about 1.2% copper in the measured / indicated category (also subject to more drilling expansion) to provide an additional 27 years of mill feed using 6000 tons per day.
The math is: 60 million ton / 6,000 tpd / 365 days a year = 27 years.
The grade is (about) 1.2% copper average
So, 6000 tpd X 365 days per year x .012 grade X .9 recovery X 2000 p per ton = 47 m pounds of copper per year for additional 27 years above the first 13 years.
At $4.70 copper ($2.84 p pound free cash-flow) X 47 m pounds = $133 m per year underground
Total additional = 27 more years of $133 m US per year, beyond the first 13 years of $184 million USD per year
========================================================
Corporate presentations:
https://nevadacopper.com/site/assets/files/4190/ncu_october_2020_final.pdf
https://nevadacopper.com/site/assets/files/4209/2021-03-ncu-cp.pdf
Robert Pavich Video (last 10 minutes is best)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hk_WhFu7FlA&feature=emb_logo
New video feature CEO Mike C.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vIEmMHVZefA
Article:
https://provenandprobable.com/copper-corrects-from-an-all-time-high-nevada-copper-offers-value-and-a-bullish-trend/
==================================================================
Summary of key NCU news releases:
2013, Sept 9: (copper~$3.30)
>>>Final permit for underground mine build, plus loan financing.
2013, Nov 14: (copper~$3.20)
>>>Stand alone open pit feasibility study filed using $2.75 copper
2014, Dec 15: (copper~$2.75)
>>>Land bill passed by Senate and House of Reps
2015, May 28: (copper~$2.45)
>>>Feasibility results. Mine life increased by 5 years.
>>>A description of economic results with three base case scenarios for copper.
2015, June 1 - July 15: (copper~$2.25)
>>>Three more positive drill result releases, including 400’ of 1% copper
2015, Aug 17: (copper~$2.25)
>>>Full permit for open pit is obtained
2015, Aug 21: (copper~$2.25)
>>>BLM conveys 10,000 acres of land to NCU.
2015, Sept 10 & Nov 3: (copper~$2.20)
>>>Two more sets of positive drill results
2016, June 9: (copper~$2.15) $4.8 million raised at $0.60.
>>>Total shares NCU shares outstanding = 88 million
2017, May 23: (copper~$2.55)
>>>Pala P.P. 10% premium to the market = $0.66 for 3.7 million shares.
>>>Total NCU shares outstanding = 93 million
2017, Dec 17 and 2018, Jan 12: (copper~$3.20)
>>>Construction financing and debt restructuring
2018, Feb 26: (copper~$3.20)
>>>Restart of underground mine construction after the raising of more funds.
2018, March 5: (copper~$3.10)
>>>$128 million from Pala for an additional 256 million shares. $0.50 each
2018, May 15: (copper~$3.05)
>>>Open pit extension drill results including 42 metres of 2% copper
2018, July 17: (copper~$2.75)
>>>Additional equity financing. $108 million, $0.60 per share;
>>>Total NCU shares outstanding = 660 million
2018, Sept 6: (copper~$2.60)
>>>$70 million received in exchange for (underground only) Au & Ag metal stream.
2018, Sept 10: (copper~$2.65)
>>>PEA received for the open pit using $3.20 long term copper.
2018, Nov 13: (copper~$2.75)
>>>Announcement to update technical report to include new info and PEA
2019, Feb 22: (copper~$2.75)
>>>Announcement of 5,700 additional acres staked for exploration, thereby expanding the Pumpkin Hollow property by 32%
2019, April 16: (copper~$2.90)
>>>New open pit PFS study published with updated numbers ($3.20 long term copper price is used)
2019, May 16: (copper~$2.70)
>>>$40 million combined private placement and public share sale $.040
2019, Dec 16: (copper~$2.80)
>>>Copper production commenced and ramp up to full 5000 tpd expected by mid 2020.
>>>65 m pounds p/ye projected from underground. Cost = $1.86 (all in sustaining cost)
2019, Dec 17: (copper~$2.80)
>>>Pala announces buying shares in the public market at $0.29 per share
>>>Pala’s total of the financing =273 million shares, ~ 36% of shares outstanding.
>>>New float is roughly 758 million shares
2020, April 6: (copper~$2.25)
>>>Covid necessitates a shutdown of the newly completed mill
>>>Underground work continues at a reduced pace
2020, July 31: (copper~$2.85)
>>>Equity sale completed. 667 million shares including the over-allotment
>>>This raises $100 million to pay down debt and cover expenses.
>>>New share price is about $0.14 after backing out about $0.02 per warrant attached.
2020, Aug 24: (copper~$2.95)
>>>Production is restarted
>>>Commissioning of hoist, vent shaft and underground crushing continues
2020, Oct 15: (copper~$3.05)
>>>Mike Ciricillo is brought on board as CEO. Mike “...was previously the Head of Copper Industrial Operations for Glencore Plc, where he oversaw Glencore’s worldwide copper assets…”
2021, Jan 29: (copper~$3.55)
>>>Equity financing; 230 million shares issued at $0.16 for proceeds of $38 million.
>>>Pala takes down an additional 80 million shares as a part of a debt to equity trade.
>>>New share total = 1.7 billion. Warrants will bring in about $100m
2021, March 18: (copper~$4.05);
>>>Some 5% ore is encountered in ‘development’ area on route to the new stopes
>>>Expect “grade increases” in combining weeks as stopes are accessed
>>>Hoist is tested to run at 5,000 TPD matching the tested mill capacity
>>>Electrical upgrades mostly completed (due to change in first stope to mine)
2021, April 21: (copper ~ $4.25):
>>>We are a few days away from the first stope to start extracting 2.2% copper
>>>Ventilation upgrades are progressing well
>>>Batch production is running very well at intermittent bursts of 4,700 tpd as development (and soon) new stope ore is being mined.
2021, May 17 (copper ~$4.70)
>>>Mike announces we will be at about 3,000 tpd by the end of q2 (June 30)
>>>Progress slowed a little as cautious progress is made through water bearing dike
>>>Covid has slowed the delivery of the Large surface fans so 5,000 tpd mid q4
=======================================================
Another way to look at it
Work backwards from q4 full 5000 tpd:
Mid Q4 = full 5000 tons per day which at $4.50 copper is $160 million /yr free cash-flow.
$160 million X 6.3 multiple = $1 billion divided by 1.8 billion shares = $0.55 p/s
add value for a permitted open pit which is an easy $0.25 to $0.40 to me
Discount back to today, less than 6 months from 5,000 tpd
Buying today at 30 cents would be a 150 %, 6 month return.
============================================================
Barrick CEO on copper as a strategic metal for the portfolio
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/investing/video/barrick-gold-ceo-says-copper-is-a-fantastic-strategic-asset~1907821
Long term copper supply / demand articles:
https://aheadoftheherd.com/copper-con/
https://www.kitco.com/commentaries/2021-05-19/Running-on-MT-peak-copper.html
https://www.mining.com/new-bull-chart-for-30000-copper-price-porphyries-nearly-mined-out/
NCU timing is perfect for new investors
New mine build-out delays mean that copper sales from the relatively high grade new underground mine are hitting the market at what appears to be decades long high copper prices.
In a few short weeks we will be at an initial 3,000 tons per day and, assuming the early ore is blended with lower grade development ore (essentially from tunnelling in) we will probably be running at 1.5% copper and then 2% soon after.
5,000 tons per day from underground will happen in mid q4 but beginning in q2, after dike grouting is completed, we will already be at 3,000 tons per day according to CEO Mike Ciricillo.
So 3,000 tons X 2,000 pounds X 30 days per month X 1.5% copper X 90% recovery equals 2,400,000 pounds of copper per month.
2,400,000 minus 700,000 hedged pounds equals 1,700,000 pounds unhedged.
1,700,000 x $2.81 (after deducting $1.86 all in cost from $4.67 copper) equals $4,777,000 plus about $750,000 from the profit on the hedged copper equals $5,500,000 per month already
At over $5,000,000 per month soon (July 2021) there are no more wolves at the door. The bills and interest are rapidly paid off as this cash flows in
In the fall this cash flow doubles or triples depending on copper prices. After that the company (according to the last presentation) may ramp up the underground to an even higher volume of 6.000 to 6,500 tpd. It was specified at 5,000 tpd but built to accommodate much more. (Talk to Rich about this... I have.)
With the resumption of drilling (the programs ended a few years ago when cash dried up during both low copper prices and expensive bills for the underground and mill construction) the underground and open pit resources will increase.
=======================================================
NCU has only just begun to price in the fact of not going bankrupt.
NCU is not yet rated as a "producer," but rather just as a "developer."
NCU is a "producer" now but the share price has yet to catch up.
Interview with CEO Mike Ciricillo
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vIEmMHVZefA
=======================================================
2021 start up cash-flow pro-forma (underground only)
2nd quarter: April, May, June:
Average blended grade of 1.3% copper
Average mining and milling rate 1500 tpd
Average $4.50 copper
Hedge portion of 2.1 m pounds
Production above the hedge (1500 tpd X 1.5% copper X 90 days X 2000 pounds per ton X 90% recovery = 3.6 m pounds, minus hedged amount = 1.5 million pounds
1.5 m pounds is below the hedge so this could mean <negative $2 million> + (negative $6 million q1 hedge> = <negative $8 million>
3rd quarter: July, Aug, Sept:
Blended grade of 1.6%, 3,000 tpd, $4.20 copper, remaining hedge of 1,000,000 pounds
Production above the hedge (3000 tpd X 1.7% copper X 90 days X 2000 p per ton X 90% recovery = 8 m pounds, minus the hedge = 7 million pounds
7m X $2.34 per pound (after all in cost) = $16 million, plus about $1 million from the hedge = $17 million free cash-flow
4th quarter: Oct, Nov, Dec:
Grade 1.9%, 5,000 tpd, no more hedge, $4.50 copper
5000 X 1.9% copper X 90 days X 90% recovery = 15.4 m pounds copper
15.4 m X $2.64 per pound = $40 m free cash-flow
2021 < q2 > + q3 + q4 total = $49 million free cash-flow
2022 (using $4.70 copper, underground only) = $184,000,000 free cash-flow.
===========================================================
Underground alone, after ramp up ($4.70 copper:)
65 million pounds per year x $2.84 ($4.70 - $1.86 = $2.84)
Free cash-flow of about $184 million USD per year at a conservative, low 5 X cash-flow multiple = $923 million, divided by 1.8 billion shares = $0.51 USD = $0.62 CAD
OPEN PIT valued as not yet developed ($4.70 copper:)
IRR (7.5% discounted) of 44% (extrapolated from NCU's Oct 2020 presentation)
NPV of $2.35 b/ 1.8 b shares = $1.30 (then discounted 75% by me) = $0.33 USD = $0.40 CAD
Total share price:$0.62 + $0.40 = $1.02 CAD
====================================================================
Underground mine after ramp up plus future open pit:
At $4.50 copper, 2.3 billion fully diluted shares and 70,000 TPD open pit:
70,000 tpd X .005 copper equivalent X 88% recovery X 2000 pounds per ton X 365 days per year = 225 million pounds plus 65 million pounds from underground = 290 million pounds X ~ $2.50 profit = $725,000,000 free cash-flow per year.
$0.725 billion p/year cash flow X5 multiple = $3.63 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $1.58 USD p/s
$0.725 billion p/year cash flow X6 multiple = $4.35 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $1.89 USD p/s
$0.725 billion p/year cash flow X7 multiple = $5.08 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $2.21 USD p/s
$0.725 billion p/year cash flow X8 multiple = $5.80 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $2.52 USD p/s
$0.725 billion p/year cash flow X9 multiple = $6.53 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $2.84 USD p/s
$0.725 billion p/year cash flow X10multiple =$7.25 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $3.15 USD p/s
$1.96 CAD to $3.91 CAD per share
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
At $5.00 copper, 2.3 billion fully diluted shares and 70,000 TPD
70,000 tpd X .005 copper equivalent X 88% recovery X 2000 pounds per ton X 365 days per year = 225 million pounds, plus 65 million pounds from underground = 290 million pounds X ~ $3.00 profit = $870,000,000 free cash-flow per year.
$0.87 billion p/year cash flow X5 multiple = $4.35 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $1.89 USD p/s
$0.87 billion p/year cash flow X6 multiple = $5.22 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $2.27 USD p/s
$0.87 billion p/year cash flow X7 multiple = $6.09 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $2.65 USD p/s
$0.87 billion p/year cash flow X8 multiple = $6.96 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $3.03 USD p/s
$0.87 billion p/year cash flow X9 multiple = $7.83 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $3.40 USD p/s
$0.87 billion p//year cash flow X10 multiple =$8.70 billion / 2.3 billion shares = $3.78 USD p/s
$2.36 CAD to $4.72 CAD per share
=============================================
Ivanhoe (IVN) KK mine versus Nevada Copper (NCU) on a future free cash flow comparison basis.
I use IVN KK mine as a comparison because it is low priced relative to future free cash-flow. Ivanhoe suffers a discount for being in the DRC. Both mines are 3 or 4 years until full production free cash flow.
IVN only owns 40% of KK and KK is about 85% of IVN’s total value that includes 3 more properties.
I am now using a larger $1.2 billion future cost to build the NCU open pit.
To this I add $600 million EV to arrive at $1.8 billion future EV for NCU versus $8.5 billion EV for IVN adjusted to the KK mine only.
| Based on copper production about 4 years from now | IVN KK40% owned DRC | | NCU 100% owned USA |
| IVN 500,000 tonnes (copper study group avg est.) Adjusted to 40%`owned | 440 million pounds | 220 million (prob more now since video) + 70 million underground | 290 million pounds |
| IVN av cost $1.15 all in cost | $3.45 C/F | NCU av cost $2.00 all in | $2.60 C/F |
| Long term avg annual free cash flow using $4.60 copper | $1.52 billion | | $750 million |
| IVN E/V adjusted to KK only | $8.5 billion | NCU EV adjusted to incl the open pit | $1.8 billion |
| IVN E/V divided by 2 to equalize free cash flow between IVN and NCU | $4.25 billion | NCU E/V is only 42% of IVN before discounting for DRC risk (see next line) | $1.8 billion |
| DRC 30 year risk adjustment is to say that the $4.25 b E/V would be $5.3 b if the KK mine were in the USA instead | $5.3 billion | NCU is currently trading at 33.9% the risk adjusted price of IVN | $1.8 billion |
| This means IVN is 3 times more expensive on future C/F basis | | | |
What this comparison tells me is that Investors in IVN are willing to pay 3 times as much per share for future cash flow from the KK mine versus buying shares in NCU.
There is no doubt that estimated share value and cash flow is always decoupled from what buyers are actually willing to pay.
=================================================
Benefits of increases in the copper price to a higher cost operation (NCU) versus a lower cost operation (IVN KK mine)
| | Ivanhoe KK | Profit up since $2.50 copper | | Nevada Copper | Profit up since $2.50 copper |
| All in cost and % mine profit | $1.15 | | | $2.03 | |
| | ======= | ====== | | ====== | ===== |
| Cash-flow at $2.50 | $1.35 / 117 % | 0 % | | $0.43 / 21 % | 0 % |
| Cash-flow at $3.00 | $1.85 / 161 % | 37 % | | $0.97 / 48 % | 128 % |
| Cash-flow at $3.50 | $2.35 / 204 % | 74 % | | $1.43 / 70 % | 233 % |
| Cash-flow at $4.00 | $2.85 / 248 % | 112% | | $1.97 / 97% | 362 % |
| Cash-flow at $4.50 | $3.35 / 291% | 149% | | $2.43 / 120 % | 471 % |
| Cash-flow at $5.00 | $3.85 / 335 % | 186% | | $2.97 / 146 % | 595 % |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
********************************************************************
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/file/annual-survey-of-mining-companies-2020-infographicjpg
Worth a read:
https://www.mining-journal.com/digital_assets/cef6461e-2984-41b3-8ce1-c11729429499/World-Risk-Report-2017-Executive-Summary.pdf
Cheers,
Notgnu
********************************************************************************************
| Based on copper production about 4 years from now | IVN KK40% owned DRC | | NCU 100% owned USA |
| IVN 500,000 tonnes (copper study group avg est.) Adjusted to 40%`owned | 440 million pounds | 220 million (prob more now since video) + 70 million underground | 290 million pounds |
| IVN av cost $1.15 all in cost | $3.45 C/F | NCU av cost $2.00 all in | $2.60 C/F |
| Long term avg annual free cash flow using $4.60 copper | $1.52 billion | | $750 million |
| IVN E/V adjusted to KK only | $8.5 billion | NCU EV adjusted to incl the open pit | $1.8 billion |
| IVN E/V divided by 2 to equalize free cash flow between IVN and NCU | $4.25 billion | NCU E/V is only 42% of IVN before discounting for DRC risk (see next line) | $1.8 billion |
| DRC 30 year risk adjustment is to say that the $4.25 b E/V would be $5.3 b if the KK mine were in the USA instead | $5.3 billion | NCU is currently trading at 33.9% the risk adjusted price of IVN | $1.8 billion |
| To me this means IVN KK is 3 times more expensive on future C/F basis than NCU | | | |
========================================================
This table compares Ivanhoe KK mine at an $8.5 billion valuation (85% of IVN EV) with NCU at an $1.8 billion valuation
The NCU valuation is the addition of $600 million for the existinting EV plus $1.2 billion to finance and build the 70,000 tpd open pit.
The copper per year production figures represent production in or around 2024 to 2025 for both mines.
These number are presented as though there is zero risk discount applied to the IVN KK mine and applying a 20% or 30% discount would add yet more relative valuation to NCU at all cash flow multiples and all copper prices from $3.00 and up
At $2.00 copper NCU is bankrupt in this model and IVN KK is still okay.
| Free cash flow at: | $2.00 | $3.00 | $4.00 | $5.00 | $6.00 | $7.00 | $8.00 | $9.00 |
| IVN KK mine
$1.15 all in cost, 480 m pounds per year (according to TA1) | $408m | $888m | $1.37b | $1.85b | $2.3b | $2.8b | $3.3b | 3.77b |
| | | | | | | | | |
| NCU underground plus open pit
$2.00 all in cost cost, 290 m pounds per year | $0.00 | $290m | $580m | $870m | $1.16b | $1.45b | $1.74b | $2.03b |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Free cash flow at $9.00 copper, divided by EV | 10 X | Divide by EV | 15 X | Divide by EV | 20 X | Divide by EV | 25X | Divide by EV |
| IVN KK | $37.7b | $4.44 | $56.5b | $6.65 | $75.4b | $8.87 | $94.3b | $11.08 |
| NCU | $20.3b | $11.28 | $30.4b | $16.88 | $40.6b | $22.55 | $50.8 | $28.2 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| Free cash flow at $7.00 copper, divided by EV | 10 X | Divide by EV | 15 X | Divide by EV | 20 X | Divide by EV | 25X | Divide by EV |
| IVN KK | $28.0b | $3.29 | $42.0b | $4.94 | $56.0b | $6.59 | $70.0b | $8.24 |
| NCU | $14.5b | $8.05 | $22.7b | $12.61 | $29.0b | $16.11 | $50.8 | $20.66 |
| Free cash flow at $5.00 copper, divided by EV | 10 X | Divide by EV | 15 X | Divide by EV | 20 X | Divide by EV | 25X | Divide by EV |
| IVN KK | $18.5b | $2.17 | $27.8b | $3.27 | $37.0b | $4.35 | $46.3b | $5.45 |
| NCU | $8.7b | $4.83 | $13.1b | $7.27 | $17.4b | $9.67 | $21.8b | $12.11 |
| Free cash flow at $3.00 copper, divided by EV | 10 X | Divide by EV | 15 X | Divide by EV | 20 X | Divide by EV | 25X | Divide by EV |
| IVN KK | $8.9b | $1.05 | $13.4b | $1.58 | $17.8b | $2.09 | $22.3b | $2.62 |
| NCU | $2.9b | $1.61 | $4.4b | $2.44 | $5.8b | $3.22 | $7.3 | $4.05 |
| Free cash flow at $2.00 copper, divided by EV | 10 X | Divide by EV | 15 X | Divide by EV | 20 X | Divide by EV | 25X | Divide by EV |
| IVN KK | $4.8b | $0.56 | $7.2b | $0.84 | $9.6b | $1.12 | $12b | $1.40 |
| NCU | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 | $0 |
===========================================================
NCU compared to IVN on an E/V basis:
Current IVN to NCU >>> Enterprise value Ratio >>>
At present you would need to own over 15 entire USA NCU mines to equal Ivanhoe's DRC properties
NCU E/V = under $600 million
IVN E/V = about $10,000 million
15 X $600 million = $9,000 million
Recent specialist funds to BUY into NCU >>>
Fourth Sail:
-
70 million shares, 19 + million warrants (approximated from corp. pres.)
-
https://www.fourthsailcap.com/our-work/
-
We spend much of our time analyzing the underlying value of cash flows of companies, which is typically where we try to capture upside. Across sectors, we strive to have deep industry knowledge, continuous contact with management teams, and a constant refinement of our assumptions and models.Regal Funds
Regal Funds:
-
31 million shares, 8.5 million warrants (approximated from corp. pres.)
-
https://www.regalfm.com/site/About-Us/approach
-
INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY
Through fundamental research Regal selects shares that it believes are undervalued and are expected to rise in price. In addition, the strategies utilise Regal’s expertise and systems to sell shares that it believes are overvalued and take advantage of a falling share price. This practice is known as ‘shorting’ and sets Regal apart from many other traditional investors as it creates more opportunity for alpha generation.
INVESTMENT PROCESS
The investment process for our funds focuses on a four-step stock selection process, which emphasises the bottom-up valuation of companies.
=================================================================
Late July of 2020 NCU is swirling around the toilet bowl due to previous bad timing and then a Covid shut down just as the mine was to be completed.
Okay, so, Pala steps up to the plate and buys 667 million shares at 16 cents (or about 14 or 15 cents if you back out the time value of the out of money warrants at that time.)
So that values the almost one year ago mine at about 1.4 billion shares X 14 cents. A lot of the money that went in from the financing went against impending debt. Other Pala debt was settled with another 80 million or so shares.
So the company still had long term debt of another $100 million or so, if memory serves, and the implied market cap was about $200 million so the Enterprise Value was about $300 million at that time.
The math that Pala and the co-financiers would have had to do could only use current copper prices, or maybe a little higher if they were encouraged at the time about a recovery in copper.
So, copper was about $2.85 at the time and the underground mine was expected to eventually put out about 60 million pounds per year of copper in concentrate.
The all-in costs, then as now, were $1.86 per pound so they were looking at 60 million pounds X about $1.00 (the difference after cost is removed.)
This gave them an outlook of $60 million per year (cash flow or fish oil or whatever you want to call it.)
Today, a year later and very near completion now, the EV is now about $525 million and bankruptcy risk is off the table, the permitted and drilled open pit become a huge and valuable multi-decade asset and the cash in rush will be about 250% of the original $1.00 ie. $2.50 or so per pound.
So, an open pit property worth let's call it 20 cents but more realistically is probably worth at least double our current share price in and of itself, plus an impending 60 million pounds X $2.50 X 5 multiple (the way Pala and company had to have calculated it ...a 5 multiple minimum, otherwise why bother at that point) gives $750 million divided by 2 billion = 37.5 cents plus 20 cents for the pit property = 57.5 cents per share today ... and IMO that is just a bare bones give away minimum.
Cheers,
Notgnu
The parable of bananas and pumpkins.
In a distant and contested land, full of desperate people, a group of jolly Canucks found an amazing banana tree. Even though the price of bananas at the time was kind of low the Canadians realized that the tree, with a little investment in pickers and boxes and ladders, could give them bananas for a low price (about $1.15 each.)
The happy Canucks made a deal with the locals to get the bananas from the tree and bring them to market. They said “we will bring the ladders and boxes and pay you to pick bananas and we will only keep 40% of the bananas and 40% ownership of the tree.”
There was much happiness and everyone celebrated. The banana chief went on a world tour telling everyone about the wonderful, cheap, perfect fat, ripe bananas.
The Canucks were extra elated when they found great reception to talk of their high grade banana find. People all over the world decided to line up and offer money… but they were not offering money for the bananas, no, they were offering money for rights to own a piece of the 40% of the rights to the banana tree and it’s production.
These people rightly decided that the whole rama-banana operation was worth many billions of dollars. They rubbed their greedy hands together imagining the riches they would reap from their banana tree.
To their surprise and added happiness banana trees in other countries began producing fewer bananas and the leaders of some of the countries decided they wanted to keep a few more of the bananas to give to hungry citizens (mainly so those citizens would not decide to eat the leaders) and then the demand for bananas started increasing.
Now, when it comes to food, bananas and pumpkins are worth the same. You can mush up a banana and mix it with mushed up pumpkins and low and behold you can push electricity through the mush.
Some other dudes, who had spent several years planting pumpkins and watering them in the hot and harsh Nevada desert, almost lost their investment when the price of pumpkin and banana mash went down to $2.50 a pound. The DRC bananas were doing fine because they were only to cost $1.15 each but the pumpkins were to cost about $2.00.
Then the price for banana pumpkin mash went up, and up. It even surpassed the wildest dreams of the early banana collectors. The high price excited the banana farmers and then their 40% ownership in the tree (and in the tree’s yet to increase size) became very valuable ($8.5 billion.)
The pumpkin growers were a little behind, and their operation smaller, but as the price of mash went up they too stood to gain more. Their market price for the farm was already so low. It had declined precipitously when banana mash was not the favoured dish. Whereas the low cost ($1.15) bananas now sell for double what was expected ($2.50 to $3.00) and thereby create double the profits (at $4.50 for mash,) the pumpkins end up selling for more than five times the profit that was originally expected (economists call this “marginal profit.”)
Pumpkins were going to cost $2.00 and be sold for maybe 50 cents more, if lucky. This created risk and it became the reason that no one wanted a pumpkin farm. Pumpkin farms were to be relegated to the dump bin.
But then, low and behold, people suddenly started realizing that pumpkins could be sold for $4.50, just like the bananas! Each pumpkin would then return five of the original fifty cents of cash flow units expected.
Many of the banana farmers, drunk on banana mash dreams, forgot to realize that pumpkins and bananas have the same value, and that you can buy the rights to sell pumpkins at about one third of the price of rights to sell DRC bananas.
$1.8 billion dollars buys you a huge pumpkin patch that is ripe in 2025 and will give 290 million pounds of pumpkins. In the same time frame there will be a fully grown DRC banana tree that, for $8.5 billion in today’s money, will give the rights to about 460 million pounds of bananas.
Check back soon for additional recipes.
Cheers,
Notgnu