RE: RE: RE: 1.41g grade There is also another dimension to all of this, -
Now, let’s turn the page and consider another aspect of this, -
How would Kazakhstan feel about a large Chinese miner partnering with Alhambra?
The scale of China’s gold initiative (driven by the government) is unprecedented in world history; and, part of this ‘strategy’ is expanding right next door, - in Kazakhstan.
• All of this brings us to another key piece of this puzzle, - the growing level of ‘linkage’ between China and Kazakhstan, which enjoy good relations from an “overall and strategic perspective”.
Make no mistake about it; possessing vast energy and mineral resources, Kazakhstan has long attracted the attention of China.
China and Kazakhstan share a vast border of 1,700 km in the North Western province of Xinjiang; with a 1998 treaty signed between the two countries ending border demarcation issues by resolving disputed areas near the Baimurz pass and the Sary-Charndy River.
• Since then, Kazakhstan has become a strategic ally in securing China’s long-term interests in the post-Soviet region.
• Very importantly, - Kazakhstan’s oil, natural gas and minerals reduce China’s excessive reliance on imported oil from the Middle East.
Geopolitically, for strategic reasons, bilateral relations have proven to be mutually beneficial to both countries. On the one hand, China seeks to preclude the growth of American influence by maintaining close ties with Kazakhstan as an offset. On the other hand, Kazakhstan seeks to neutralize Russia’s geopolitical and economic influence on it by cementing its links with China.
• While cooperation with Kazakhstan affords China a buffer zone between it and Russia, such an alliance with China simultaneously helps Kazakhstan balance the heavy geopolitical influence of its Northern neighbor (Russia).
The foundations of ‘China-Kazakhstan bilateral relations’ date back to January 3, 1992, when a Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Bilateral Relations between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Kazakhstan was signed; followed by the conclusion of the ‘Joint Statement on the Foundation of the Friendly Relations’ in October, 1993.
• More recently, in June 2011, China and Kazakhstan decided to develop a comprehensive strategic partnership, and, in January, 2012, at the meeting of the senior legislators of China and Kazakhstan, the intentions of both countries to further deepen mutual cooperation (achieved over the last 20 years) became ‘discernible’.
• Nazarbayev's successful visit to China in June 2012 injected new impetus into the development of the comprehensive strategic partnership between these two countries. (Since its independence, ‘Kazakhstan has committed itself to developing a close, friendly partnership of mutual trust with China’, he said).
• Then again, just last month, Chinese and Kazakh leaders took concrete action to strengthen the cooperation between their two countries as Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev and visiting Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan met to discuss the development of relations between their two countries, with emphasis on cooperation.
• Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan and Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister Kairat Kelimbetov signed documents on bilateral cooperation after the sixth meeting of the ‘Cooperation Committee Between Kazakhstan and China’ in Astana, Kazakstan (Dec. 8, 2012).
• Wang pointed out that the economies of China and Kazakhstan are of high complement to each other and carry a huge potential for cooperation.
For his part, Nazarbayev (who has visited China 11 times) said Kazakhstan congratulates the Communist Party of China on the success of the 18th National Congress.
While little inherent cultural connection exists with China (Kazakhstan's people have long felt a deep connection to Russia, in language, culture and lifestyle) this ‘linkage’ with China does provide Kazakhstan deeper political ties to a world power; still, in the minds of ordinary Kazaks, an intrinsic trepidation looms of losing their identity and culture to their powerful neighbor.
While the Chinese authorities make a point of honoring the establishment of cordial relations with all five Central Asian states, it is clear that Kazakhstan enjoys a unique status; since 2005 the China-Kazakhstan partnership has been termed a “strategic” one, the highest of diplomatic epithets, confirming that Astana is considered a major political ally by Beijing in the post-Soviet space, - and all the more so at a time when the Kazakh government is displaying balanced and diversified policies in the face of Moscow’s heavy-handed presence.
• In November, 2012, a delegation from the Chinese National Defense University made an official visit to Kazakhstan, marking yet another high-profile exchange between the two countries’ defense establishments. According to Major General Yedil Urazov, the head of the military education and science department in Kazakhstan’s ministry of defense, China is one of Kazakhstan’s “priority” defense partners.
• The Kazakhstani and Chinese armed forces started such defense exchanges in 1993, soon after Kazakhstan became an independent country.
• When they met in Beijing in June 2012, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Chinese President Hu Jintao declared their intent to intensify cooperation against the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism.
• (While China provides non-lethal defense equipment to Kazakhstan such as uniforms, jeeps and other vehicles, communications systems, and information technologies, Russia remains the main supplier of advanced weapons systems). Kazakhstan’s hopes of receiving decommissioned weapons from the rapidly modernizing People’s Liberation Army have been thwarted by Beijing’s refusal to challenge Russia’s jealously guarded role as the primary supplier of advanced defense equipment to the Central Asian militaries.
• In contrast to their modest engagements with China, the Kazakhstani armed forces have much broader and deeper ties with Russia, with the two defense establishments sharing doctrine, weapons and training; and hundreds of Kazakhstani officers regularly enroll in Russian military academies.
Now, it is time to consider China’s ‘soft power’.
In international affairs, the term ‘soft power’ refers to a country’s attempts to gain influence through co-operation and persuasion rather than by exercising brute force; as creating goodwill (through foreign aid, the spread of culture such as arts, film and music, and of course diplomacy) replaces economic sanctions and threats of military intervention; - with the sharp point of the spear being offers to reduce trade barriers and promote cultural exchanges.
• Over the last two decades, China has increasingly relied upon soft power as a means of building global relations, such as spending billions on aid programs to Africa and Latin America, while improving its global image through high-profile events like the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Expo.
• Some astute analysts regard soft power as “the most potent weapon in Beijing’s foreign policy arsenal”, claiming it has been indispensable in counter-balancing the “China threat” perception that emerged in the early 1990s over the Dragon’s continued economic and military growth.
Several years ago, someone slyly remarked that China is “taking Central Asia from under the nose of Russia”.
All in all, emerging trends both in China and Kazakhstan are setting the stage; providing exceedingly favorable conditions and circumstances, a welcoming landscape within which Alhambra can do its thing.