RE: RE: Worst Case Senario There has been an arbitrage between the Preferred A and B and the common for quite a while, and I wouldn't make much of it. You wouldn't want to own the Preferred as a way to buy common on the cheap unless you wanted to own the common. And I strongly feel common will be compromised here by waves of dilution, assuming you do NOT get CCAA. If you get CCAA common is likely worthless.
At this point I think there are two good ways to play this disaster. There is a value play on the MTN bonds, assuming you have a good calculation for value of the enterprise going forward. I don't like that as a distressed investment because the business is in too much flux. And I think projecting an EBITDA multiple for 2014 on a shrinking business is just voodoo, not investing.
As a speculation, I like the Preferred C and D. But after listening to the conference call - and for the first time realizing that the credit line agreement between banks and Yellow is actually a disastrous agreement for Yellow (because it forbids paying back MTNs for pennies on the dollar unless $125M is not used on the credit line) - I think there is a 95% chance that the Preferred C and D will also end up worthless. I think it is an okay roll of dice buying Preferred C / D below 60 cents, and I am a seller above $1.20.
I think believing that the common or Preferred can regain substantial value, in an environment where Yellow is forbidden from buying back MTNs, is delusional. Your point yesterday that you think Yellow can renegotiate the bank credit line to allow repayment of the MTNs is well taken. But for me to believe in that scenario I want management to be saying things it is not saying. I think it is also possible that Yellow will do a vulture fund financing to replace the credit line with funds that have fewer constraints. But private equity money will come with warrants that will likely wipe out common, and probably 50% chance of wiping out preferreds.
I don't see a path to the promised land here.