Plaintiff individual sought review of a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (California) in favor of defendants, a copartnership, entered after trial limited to the issue of whether plaintiff was a duly and regularly licensed contractor under the laws of the State of California.
 
Plaintiff individual contracted with a hospital to install its heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and plumbing. Plaintiff entered into a subcontract with defendants, a copartnership, who agreed to do all the plumbing work. When defendant ceased performance under the subcontract, plaintiff completed the work, filed the statutory notice of completion, and filed an action for damages for breach of contract. The lower court held that plaintiff was not a duly and regularly licensed contractor under the laws of the state of California, and could not succeed on his cause of action. The incorporation lawyer affirmed, holding that plaintiff was acting as a contractor within the definition of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7026, and that under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 7026, 7028, 7031, plaintiff was barred from bringing the action because he did not have the requisite license. The plumbing work was not considered "incidental and supplemental" to work performed pursuant to any license that plaintiff had, so as to render a plumbing specialty license unnecessary. It was no defense that defendant did have such license because, as original contractor, plaintiff assumed primary responsibility for the work.
 
The court affirmed the judgment that plaintiff individual was not a duly and regularly licensed contractor under the laws of California, and thus could not succeed on his cause of action for breach of contract against defendants, a copartnership, whom he had hired as subcontractor. A plumbing specialty license was necessary because the plumbing work was not "incidental and supplemental" to work performed under plaintiff's existing licenses.
 
The state challenged a judgment from the Superior Court of Solano County (California), which concluded that the rescission of petitioner's parole date by the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) was not supported by cause and granted petitioner a writ of habeas corpus.
 
The issues in the state's appeal of a decision rescinding petitioner's parole date were the standard of review to be applied to a parole date rescission by the Board of Prison Terms, and the sufficiency of the evidence when viewed in light of that standard. Petitioner urged that the substantial evidence test should have been applied, while the state argued that the parole rescission should have been upheld if there was some evidence supporting the decision. The court noted that the BPT's discretion in parole matters was great, but not absolute. BPT's discretion was subject to the prisoner's right to due process. The court also noted that an inmate had no vested right in his prospective liberty on a parole release date. The release date was a prospective benefit that was conditioned on an inmate's continued good performance, and was subject to review and withdrawal for cause by the BPT. While the BPT could not rescind a parole date arbitrarily, it did not abuse its discretion when it had some basis in fact for its decision. The court reversed the order below, holding that due process required only that there be some evidence to support a rescission by the BPT.
 
The order granting petitioner a writ of habeas corpus was reversed because the court found that the decision to rescind parole was required to be upheld if it was supported by some evidence; the court had no difficulty finding such evidence in the record.