RE: RE: Crickets... All just the opinion of an actual shareholder trying to desperately piece together and justify the events of the past couple of months...
074 is GMP... and 007 is TD... 074 buying everything 007 is selling for the past month or more... remember GMP was the one calling out GGN on the last conference call and publicly stating (i.e. for the public record) they have been approaching GGN since October 2012 offering cash/financing if and when they needed it.
Of course the 'emergency' and 'sudden' equipment failure (which also coincidentially occured in and around the Christmas season when most of the world is on holidays) made doing such a normal deal with GMP 'impossible'.
Don't forget GGNs financial situation was supposedly worsened by the fact that GGN management made conscious decisions to make a number of rather large purchases/payables in the weeks leading up to the 'boiler failure' (i.e. Catepillar contract downpayment and subsequent large initial monthly payments).
The debt payment to Waterton due on January 31 was only something like $150K. The payables and the Waterton debt combined were the reasons for the 'emergency'. All happened at the same time and all happended in and around the Christmas season. Man, what bad luck they seemed to have had?
My question: Did production/cash flow at that time (Decemebr 2012) justify the relativley large expense and payable decisions in the absence of addtional financing? (I might add I find it very ironic that we now know GGN had in fact been approached for additional financing if it was required. Non-Waterton financing at that.)
Would not seem to be the case based on anything publicly released. If not, then why were those expenditure decisions made?
Why didn't GGN raise more cash when it was available/offered when they made the decision to add to payables and sign heavy equipment contracts with Catepillar (Dec 5 2012)? We were told of 'tough market conditions'... yet we now hear of a large investment bank being given the cold shoulder for months. Why?
Why the reluctance to diversify debt away from Waterton when even our oen CEO referred to them as "lenders of last resort" on the last call?
What are the chances the self-imposed payables and sudden equipment failure occur simultaneously and 'justify' selling a majority interest within days/weeks to this same "lender of last resort" when other interested parties existed?
So many questions to be answered.
Regardless 074 seems confident in equity.
| House Positions for C:GGN from 20130208 to 20130308 |
| 74 GMP | 3,506,000 | 154,465 | 0.044 | 20,000 | 800 | 0.04 | 3,486,000 | -153,665 |
| 85 Scotia | 346,915 | 14,679 | 0.042 | 75,000 | 3,000 | 0.04 | 271,915 | -11,679 |
| 1 Anonymous | 863,000 | 37,095 | 0.043 | 672,000 | 29,680 | 0.044 | 191,000 | -7,415 |
| 124 Questrade | 39,500 | 1,807 | 0.046 | 7,750 | 356 | 0.046 | 31,750 | -1,451 |
| 22 Fidelity | 20,000 | 850 | 0.043 | 0 | | 20,000 | -850 |
| 36 Latimer | 47,550 | 1,913 | 0.04 | 43,536 | 1,813 | 0.042 | 4,014 | -100 |
| 88 Credential | 4,000 | 220 | 0.055 | 0 | | 4,000 | -220 |
| 9 BMO Nesbitt | 2,500 | 115 | 0.046 | 0 | | 2,500 | -115 |
| 28 BBS | 50,000 | 2,000 | 0.04 | 50,000 | 2,150 | 0.043 | 0 | 150 |
| 2 RBC | 151,421 | 6,106 | 0.04 | 153,000 | 7,150 | 0.047 | -1,579 | 1,044 |
| 19 Desjardins | 60,000 | 2,685 | 0.045 | 85,300 | 3,438 | 0.04 | -25,300 | 753 |
| 57 Interactive | 0 | | 28,000 | 1,335 | 0.048 | -28,000 | 1,335 |
| 58 Qtrade | 0 | | 62,500 | 2,625 | 0.042 | -62,500 | 2,625 |
| 81 HSBC | 0 | | 80,000 | 3,200 | 0.04 | -80,000 | 3,200 |
| 79 CIBC | 162,700 | 6,784 | 0.042 | 254,000 | 11,250 | 0.044 | -91,300 | 4,466 |
| 80 National Bank | 11,000 | 440 | 0.04 | 226,000 | 9,040 | 0.04 | -215,000 | 8,600 |
| 14 ITG | 15,000 | 585 | 0.039 | 300,000 | 13,500 | 0.045 | -285,000 | 12,915 |
| 33 Canaccord | 186,000 | 7,465 | 0.04 | 570,000 | 23,960 | 0.042 | -384,000 | 16,495 |
| 7 TD Sec | 643,500 | 24,507 | 0.038 | 3,482,000 | 148,419 | 0.043 | -2,838,500 | 123,912 |
| TOTAL | 6,109,086 | 261,716 | 0.043 | 6,109,086 | 261,716 | 0.043 | 0 | 0 |