WHO SAID WHAT? The Security Challenges of Modern DisinformBoth Moscow and Beijing have developed sophisticated information doctrines as part of their strategy to consolidate control domestically, and to advance foreign-policy objectives. Both coordinate messages across multiple platforms, with consistent lines advanced through regular news outlets and social media in many languages. Disinformation serves immediate and longer-term strategic objectives. There are important differences, however, between the Russian and Chinese approaches: • Russia attempts to alter the perception of reality, and identifies exploitable divisions in its target audiences. It pushes a nationalist agenda more than an ideological one and targets the Russian population to prevent dissent. The surrounding band of states which were once part of the USSR are attacked with messages which may ultimately support hybrid warfare. Operations against Western populations aim to weaken resistance to Russian state objectives. In supporting Syria, Russia has used disinformation to cover the brutality of its attacks on civilian populations; • China has created a domestic cyber fortress, and reinforced it with Chinese technology and Chinese high-tech companies. The messages projected domestically and globally are both nationalistic and ideological. Beijing uses its version of soft power to influence the policies of the international community, making effective use of economic power and the presence, in countries of interest, of Chinese populations and businesses; and • Russia’s disinformation machinery is explicitly weaponised as a resource for future wars, weakening a target country’s sense of danger and diminishing the will to resist. China wants acceptance of its legitimacy as a great power while rejecting international standards it does not agree with. WHO SAID WHAT? THE SECURITY CHALLENGES OF MODERN DISINFORMATION 9 The stream of disinformation also flows from other actors: • In the Philippines, disinformation has been used as a tactic to influence voters in the presidential election, justify the street anti-drug campaign, discredit critics, and de-legitimise mainstream media; • During the Brexit campaign large numbers of Twitter accounts were active, particularly on the Leave side. Most disappeared immediately after the vote, strongly indicating they were driven by bots. In their content they reflected the hyper-partisan and simplistic style of the British tabloid press. Independent emergent activists State disinformation agencies are part of a complex system which includes independent activists with different but overlapping motivations. Many see hidden conspiracies behind headline events such as mass shootings, or even deny that they happened. They believe Western governments are untrustworthy, manipulate world events, and are aided in hiding the truth by the traditional media. Most are anti-globalist, with a nationalist and anti-immigration rhetoric that attracts elements of both the left and right. Independent actors use social media and specialised web sites to strategically reinforce and spread messages compatible with their own. Their networks are infiltrated and used by state media disinformation organisations to amplify the state’s own disinformation strategies against target populations. The extent to which activities within this complex system are orchestrated, and by whom, remains unclear. Agents of disinformation: The enablers The information ecosystem enables large-scale disinformation campaigns. False news is spread in many ways, but Facebook and Twitter are especially important tools. Both are used to target specific population segments. Individuals accept the false news as credible or useful, and spread it further. State agencies make extensive use of 10 WHO SAID WHAT? THE SECURITY CHALLENGES OF MODERN DISINFORMATION bots and phoney accounts to popularise false news stories, and spread them in cascading volumes impossible for human actors to produce or vet individually. Social media companies are becoming aware of their role in the problem, but not all Silicon Valley leaders are convinced of their responsibility to eliminate false news. Fighting spam is a business necessity, but terminating accounts or checking content constrains profitability. Social media companies have a philosophical commitment to the open sharing of information, and many have a limited understanding of the world of intelligence operations. They are reluctant to ally with intelligence agencies and mainstream news organisations to take up the detailed task of monitoring content.
disinformation_post-report_eng.pdf (canada.ca)